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1951 1952 Olympics USSR

1951: The Soviet Union Joins the IOC

In 1952, the Soviet Union made its long-anticipated debut at the Olympic Games, and elite competitive gymnastics, along with the broader world of international sports, would never be the same. But how did a country so wary of Western influence, and so determined to control its global image, come to participate in what was once seen as a bourgeois spectacle?

The path to participation was anything but straightforward. It involved high-level political debates, intense internal pressure to guarantee victory, and even intelligence gathering to assess the strength of foreign competitors. Thanks to the work of historian Jenifer Parks, we now have a clearer picture of the motives, hesitations, and strategies behind this monumental shift. Here’s a very brief overview of what happened.

Reminder: The Soviet Union had participated in the 1937 Workers’ Olympiad. Unfortunately, at the time of this writing, I have not been able to track down the results of the gymnastics competition in 1937.

USSR. October 15, 1956. Soviet gymnast, two-times all-around Olympic gold winner, Viktor Chukarin. Leonid Dorensky/TASS PUBLICATIONxINxGERxAUTxONLY 32429491

Quick Facts:

  • In 1949, the FIG (International Gymnastics Federation) admitted the Soviet Union.
  • The Olympic Committee of the USSR was formed on April 21, 1951.
  • Weeks later, the IOC recognized the new body at its 45th session.
  • Additionally, Konstantin Andrianov became an IOC member in 1951.

The Soviet Union weighed participating in the 1948 Olympics but ultimately held back, wary of falling short in the medal count.

Note: Nikolai Romanov was the chairman of the USSR Committee on Physical Culture and Sport. The Politburo was the principal policymaking committee of the communist party in the Soviet Union.

Note #2: The following quotes come from Jenifer Parks’s “Verbal Gymnastics: Sports, Bureaucracy, and the Soviet Union’s Entrance into the Olympic Games, 1946-1952.”

In 1947, Nikolai Romanov, in a letter to Politburo member Andrei Zhdanov, asked permission to prepare a Soviet team for the 1948 Olympic Games, stressing the huge popularity of the Games throughout the world, the increasing number of countries joining the Olympics, and the idealized message of the Olympic Movement to justify his request. According to Romanov, Stalin believed that even the second place finish of Soviet wrestlers at the 1946 European Championships could discredit the Soviet Union and chastised Romanov for sending a team to the competition: “if you are not ready, then there’s no need to participate.” From this exchange, Romanov drew the lesson that only the guarantee of first place would induce the Soviet leadership to send athletes to compete abroad. Following Stalin’s cue, Romanov couched his request to send a team to the 1948 Olympics in terms of “total team victory.” Since Soviet athletes could reasonably hope only for second, third, or fourth place in events such as track and field, boxing, and swimming, where the United States held prominence, Romanov conceded that the Soviet Union could not surpass the United States in medals. Reporting to Zhdanov in 1947 that competing nations observed an unofficial point system based on the first six places in each event, he asserted nonetheless that by competing in every sport on the program and placing in the top six in those sports the Soviet team could secure full team victory based on the “unofficial” points system.

The IOC feared the Soviets might crash the 1952 Olympics—uninvited but impossible to ignore.

Note: Edström was the IOC president from 1946 to 1952. Brundage served as IOC president from 1952 to 1972.

Unable to reconcile the Soviet Union’s possible entrance with the Olympic amateur ideal, Brundage found refuge in the IOC’s bureaucratic process. Before the Soviet Union formed a National Olympic Committee (NOC) and petitioned the IOC for recognition in 1951, Brundage could avoid dealing with the challenge to the Olympic amateur ideal and focus instead on the more clearly defined rules of the IOC under which no country lacking a National Olympic Committee would be invited to participate in the Olympic Games. Edstrom now made several attempts to persuade Nikolai Romanov, chairman of the Soviet Sports Committee, that the Soviet Union would be allowed to participate in the Olympic Games only if it followed IOC rules and formed a National Olympic Committee. The many missives Edström sent to Romanov went unanswered, creating further anxiety for the IOC president and vice-president. Hearing nothing from their Soviet contact, Edstrom and Brundage worried that the Soviet Union might cause embarrassment to the IOC by sending a delegation to Helsinki with or without official recognition. Reminding Edstrom of the Soviet Union’s unexpected appearance at the 1946 European Track and Field Championships in Oslo, Brundage stated:

‘It would not surprise me if they tried the same stunt at Helsinki in 1952 … Not only the IOC but also our Finnish friends must be prepared for this contingency in order to avoid finding ourselves in the middle of a most embarrassing and dangerous controversy.’

Romanov’s silence, however, had more to do with indecision within the Soviet party-state bureaucracy than with a plot to enter the Olympics on their own terms.

Brundage worried that the Soviet Union would bring the IOC “nothing but trouble.”

Unlike many of his colleagues, Brundage lacked an aristocratic pedigree, having risen to a position of wealth and prominence through business. This self-made man, however, betrayed the “gentlemen’s club” mentality of the IOC when, in a circular letter to IOC members, he waxed nostalgic over the days when

‘the care exercised in the selection of the individuals who composed the IOC produced members who, no matter where they came from or what their language, were of the same general type and they were soon welded into what has so often been called the “Olympic Family.’”

In Brundage’s view, the Soviets, “not understanding fair play, good sportsmanship and amateurism,” were obviously not of “the same general type” as the current IOC members and would “bring with them nothing but trouble.”

Privately, Soviet officials were sweating. Could they actually beat the West in medals? Just to be safe, they did their homework—on everyone else’s athletes.

Despite the election of Andrianov to the IOC and the recognition of the Soviet NOC, the Soviet leadership continued to withhold permission for a team to be sent to the Games: invitations to compete in both the winter Games in Oslo and the Helsinki Summer Games remained unanswered. As budget constraints and continued avoidance of foreign sporting contacts further jeopardized the Olympic project, Romanov relied heavily on Andrianov and other leaders within the Sports Committee to maintain control over Olympic training measures. In June 1951, the official invitation to participate in the 1952 winter Games set off a flurry of in-house memos and reports deliberating on the Soviet athletes’ chances of success. With the decision to compete in either the winter or summer Games still up in the air, Andrianov called on various departments in the sports apparatus to compare their athletes’ achievements to those of foreign athletes to assess the state of Olympic training. Setting November 1, 1951, as the deadline, Andrianov hoped to gather all necessary information so that a decision could be reached regarding Olympic participation.

[…]

Romanov and the sports administrators now had to guarantee a full team victory under continued restrictions on international competition, and Soviet sports leaders struggled with the question of international experience almost to the eve of the Soviet Olympic debut. On April 30, 1952, less than two months before the opening of the Games in Helsinki, Romanov wrote to Malenkov requesting that the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) provide information to the Sport Committee about the Olympic training of foreign athletes, specifically those from the USA, England, Switzerland, and France. This request strongly suggests that the dearth of foreign sporting contacts continued in the months leading up to the Helsinki Olympics, forcing Romanov to obtain through the MVD what his committee had been unable to get through international competition and trainer exchanges. Working under political and ideological constraints, trainers and bureaucrats maintained their call for more international meets, tried to find out as much as possible about foreign sporting activities, and did everything they could to prepare their athletes.

Officially, the U.S. topped the medal tally in 1952. Unofficially? The Soviets had a different version of events.

The reason for this becomes clear as one looks at discrepancies in the unofficial point totals of the United States and the Soviet Union. At the end of the Olympic Games in Helsinki, Pravda (Truth), the official newspaper of the Communist Party, proclaimed victory without reference to point totals, reporting simply that the “athletes of the Soviet Union took first place.” On the same day, the New York Times claimed a win for the USA based on a score of 614 to 553 ½. Upon his return to Soviet Union, Romanov told the members of the Politburo that while the United States had won more medals in the Games, the Soviet Union tied with the USA in terms of points, with 494. This revised total appeared in the New York Times on August 7. Part of the disparity comes from the use of two different point systems. Romanov calculated his results assigning seven points for first place, five for second, four for third, etc., but the United States’ system gave ten points for first place. Hours after Romanov’s appearance before the Politburo, Malenkov called to confirm the totals. Malenkov put to rest any fears Romanov might have had over his fate by telling him to “Relax. Go home. Rest.” After the Games, criticism for poor performance in certain events fell on athletes and trainers, rather than on Romanov and the Sports Committee. Satisfied with the assurance that the United States had not won outright, the Politburo declared its first Olympic Games an adequate success, and Romanov’s point tally became the official word for the next fifty years. In October 2002, however, Aksel’ Vartanian recalculated the points and found that even by Romanov’s point system, the United States came out on top with a score of 495 to 487. The fact that his point totals remained unchallenged for fifty years indicates the security of Romanov’s position and the influence he enjoyed in the Politburo.


More on 1952

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1952 Hungary MAG Perfect 10 USSR WAG

1952: Perfect 10s Abound during a Soviet Union vs. Hungary Dual Meet

In 1952, the Soviet national gymnastics team traveled to Hungary for a dual meet that coincided with Hungarian-Soviet Friendship Month. This event turned out to be a bellwether for the 1952 competition season. 

At the time, Hungary’s gymnasts had already proven themselves on the world stage, with the women’s team securing second place and the men’s team finishing third at the 1948 Olympics. 

For the Soviet gymnasts, on the other hand, the Helsinki Olympics were particularly pivotal as it represented their first major international meet organized by the International Gymnastics Federation’s (FIG) — though they had previously competed in non-FIG events like the Workers’ Olympiad. The Soviet team’s outstanding performance at this meet made it clear that they would be strong medal contenders at the upcoming 1952 Helsinki Olympics.

From a gymnastics history perspective, this competition is also fascinating because there were three perfect 10s: one from Medea Jugeli for her compulsory vault, one from Dmytro Leonkin for his compulsory rings routine, and one from Viktor Chukarin for his optional pommel horse routine.

Here’s what else happened during the competition.

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1974 USSR World Championships

1974: Sovetsky Sport’s Recap of the World Championships in Varna

After the 1974 World Championships in Varna, Stanislav Tokarev, Sovetsky Sport’s special correspondent in Varna, took a step back and reflected on the trends in men’s and women’s artistic gymnastics. In so doing, he asked a question that the gymnastics community continues to ask itself 50 years later: Should participation at major competitions be limited to only the best of the best? 

Tokarev rejoiced in seeing up-and-coming gymnastics programs participate in Varna, and he criticized the FIG’s qualification process for the 1976 Olympics, which would limit the number of teams in Montréal. 

Here’s a translation of his column.

Olga Korbut taking part in the World Gymnastic Championships in Varna, Bulgaria. Original Publication: People Disc – HG0074 (Photo by D Deynov/Getty Images)
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1974 Interviews & Profiles USSR WAG

1974: Gymnastics without Kuchinskaya but with Tourischeva and Korbut

In 1970, Stanislav Tokarev published an article titled “Gymnastics without Natasha?…” in the magazine Yunost. In it, he announced Natalia (Natasha) Kuchinskaya’s retirement from the sport and observed that the careers of gymnastics stars were much shorter. In addition, he praised the next generation of gymnasts, including Nina Dronova, whom he nicknamed “The Mozart of Gymnastics.”

Four years later, Tokarev wrote a follow-up article in which he opines on several burning questions: Why didn’t Nina Dronova live up to her potential? How do you become Olga Korbut? Why can’t Olga Korbut beat Ludmila Tourischeva in the all-around? What is it like for the Soviet Union to have such deep wells of talent? 

Below, you’ll find a translation of the article “Without Natasha, but with Lyuda and Olya.” It was published in the September 1974 issue of Yunost  — right before the 1974 World Championships in Varna.

Ludmila Tourischeva and Olga Korbut at a competition between Canada, West Germany, and the Soviet Union in 1972
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1973 Interviews & Profiles USSR

1973: Olga Korbut Mania in the Soviet Union

The Soviet Union, like the rest of the world, wasn’t immune to Korbut mania. She appeared in numerous newspaper articles and photographs. The country’s media followed along as the Women’s Technical Committee considered banning Korbut’s famous skills, and the newspaper Izvestiia portrayed Korbut as the star of the Soviet gymnasts’ British tour. There even was a short film about Korbut in 1973. It was titled The Joys, the Sorrows, and the Dreams of Olga Korbut (Радости, огорчения, мечты Ольги Корбут).

Below, you’ll find a small collection of Soviet media about Korbut, including the aforementioned film and an article from Soviet Woman, a bimonthly illustrated magazine out of Moscow.

Olga Korbut (USSR) Womens Gymnastics Munich Olympics 1972.

Note #1: There will be references to Knysh below. It should also be mentioned that Korbut has alleged that Knysh sexually assaulted her. Knysh denied the allegations. He died in 2019.

Note #2: There will be references to weight and weight-shaming in this article.

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1973 USA USSR

1973: Olga Korbut Mania

It’s an understatement to say that the world couldn’t get enough of Korbut after the 1972 Olympics.

In fact, after the Munich Olympics, the Soviet team didn’t go home. They left immediately for a tour of West Germany, which upset Korbut. As she recalls her autobiography, My Story, she just wanted to go home:

So, after we had already done our best at the Olympics, expending our entire physical and emotional strength, we had to travel from one city to another for the next two weeks, sometimes performing as often as twice a day. We would have to use non-standard small apparatuses in small school gymnasiums, but that was the least of our problems. It was as though someone had gone up to Bob Beamon, the Olympic long-jump champion at Mexico City in 1968, right after he had jumped an incredible 29 ft 2½ in, and said, “Good job, Bob, you’ve done well. Now you have to jump again, for at least thirty feet this time.

The Sports Committee’s only interest was making more money, even if it was at the expense of our health and emotional well-being. We were like slave labor to them.

My Story

The touring didn’t stop there, and because Korbut was the biggest star on the team, the contracts reportedly demanded that Korbut participate in the tours — even when she didn’t want to. As Korbut tells it, she didn’t want to come to the United States, and Larisa Latynina, the head coach at the time, had to fetch her.

Once Korbut and the rest of the Soviet team made it to the United States, they performed around the country and made a trip to the White House to meet with President Nixon. Members of an unofficial Olga Korbut fan club greeted them everywhere, and Korbut appeared on the cover of Sports Illustrated.

If that weren’t tiring enough, a few months later, the Soviet team headed to Great Britain, where Korbut was the star, appearing on British billboards and headlining exhibitions.

Of course, there were detractors — those who didn’t think Korbut’s gymnastics was all it was cracked up to be. But their voices were largely outnumbered by far more enthusiastic ones.

In the following post, we’ll look at a small fraction of the Olga mania that swept the globe in 1973.

(Original Caption) Los Angeles, California: Russian Olympic gold medal winner Olga Korbut, 17, holds up a “Olga Korbut” t-shirt that was presented to her by her Beverly Hills, Calif., fan club. Miss Korbut, and a group of Russian gymnasts, arrived in Los Angeles 3/13 where they will put on an exhibition 3/14.
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1973 FIG Congress USSR WAG

1973: The Quixotic Quest to Ban Korbut’s Skills

In 1973, newspapers around the globe printed some version of this headline: “Olga ‘May Say Goodbye Forever.’”

The articles typically went on to explain that Olga Korbut, the fan favorite of the Munich Games, might end her gymnastics career because the FIG had decided that her skills were too dangerous.

Not surprisingly, the newspapers got some of the details wrong. One Japanese newspaper wrote, “The 89-pound Olympic gold medalist has been banned from performing a breathtaking double backward somersault on the balance beam” (The Daily Yomiuri, July 18, 1973).

To be clear, the FIG did not ban a double back on the beam, nor did Korbut perform a double back on the beam. But in early 1973, the Women’s Technical Committee (WTC) was set to ban two skills that Korbut popularized: the standing back tuck on beam, as well as dismounting the bars by pushing off with one’s feet.

Then, over the course of the year, the members of the WTC slowly walked back their decision.

So, here’s a brief history of the Women’s Technical Committee’s decisions in 1973, as well as a translation of Korbut’s interview that sent shockwaves around the globe.

Bildnummer: 03508694 Datum: 28.08.1972 Copyright: imago/Werner Schulze Olga Korbut (UdSSR) – Stufenbarren; quer Olympische Spiele 1972 Sommerspiele Kunstturnen Geräteturnen Vneg Vsw München Turnen OS Sommer Damen Einzel Einzelbild Aktion Personen Kurios

Reminder: Korbut was not the only gymnast to do a standing back tuck on beam at the 1972 Olympics. Nancy Thies (USA) also did one in Munich. Nor was she the only gymnast to dismount the uneven bars using her feet. Her teammate Bogdanova was doing a double-twisting version of Korbut’s dismount. Korbut was the most famous gymnast to perform those skills and thus became a lightning rod for the issue.

Note: The articles below will mention Korbut’s coach. Korbut has alleged that Knysh sexually assaulted her. Knysh has denied the allegations.

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1973 Interviews & Profiles MAG USSR

1973: A Profile of Viktor Klimenko – “Catching up and Overtaking”

In July of 1973, after Viktor Klimenko won his second European all-around title, Stadión, a weekly Czechoslovak sports magazine, published a profile on him. It offers details about his early years in the sport, his rivalries within the Soviet team, his coaching changes, his recovery from an Achilles tear that occurred during the 1971 European Championships, and more.

Enjoy!

Note: You can read a much shorter profile of the Klimenko brothers from 1972 here.

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1972 1973 MAG Romania USSR WAG

1972/3: Comăneci Wins the All-Around in Dual Meets with the USSR

In 1972 and 1973, the Romania juniors competed against the Soviet juniors in dual meets. In both years, Comăneci won the all-around.

In other words, long before the Montreal Olympics, the Soviets knew they would be up against stiff competition. In fact, Larisa Latynina, the head coach of the Soviet team, would refer to Comăneci as the “Romanian Korbut” after the 1973 Friendship Cup.

Here are the Romanian news reports on the dual meets. Plus, there’s an early profile of Comăneci included at the end.

Reminder: In 1972, the Soviet newspapers didn’t know how to spell Comăneci’s surname.

Sportul, April 22, 1973
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1972 MAG USSR WAG

1972: Bichukina First, Kim Second at the Soviet National Youth Championships

Months after Olga Korbut captivated the world’s attention in Munich, there was a national youth championship in Zaporizhzhia, and a familiar name — Nellie Kim — took second behind Raisa Bichukina, a much less familiar name to today’s gymnastics fans. (Kim was leading after the preliminary competitions.)

The path from junior elite to senior elite is never easy. Of the top juniors in 1972, only Kim and Grozdova would make the 1976 Olympic team. On the men’s side, several of the top juniors in 1972 would go on to have successful senior careers, including Marchenko, Markelov, and Dityatin.

What fascinates me about this event is the coverage. It raises hard questions: Was the nation in too much of a hurry to have young gymnasts competing on a major stage? Are they forcing gymnasts to compete too much? At the same time, the articles marvel at the gymnasts’ talent. The next generation of women’s artistic gymnasts was performing the most difficult skills in the world, including the same vault that Nikolai Andrianov competed in Munich.

Datum: 25.07.1980 Copyright: imago/Sven Simon Nelli Kim (USSR)