In 1952, women’s gymnastics underwent a significant transformation. The Soviet Union made its Olympic debut, and the rest of the field struggled to keep pace. Strength clashed with artistry, difficulty with elegance, and the sport suddenly felt bigger than scores alone. The question was no longer just who would win, but what kind of gymnastics would set the standard for the future.
Here’s what happened on Wednesday, July 23, 1952, during the optionals portion of the competition.
Who really stole the show in Helsinki—the powerhouse newcomers in snake-green, or the regal World Champions gliding like deer through a sunlit forest? (Those descriptions will make sense if you read on.)
And when the chalk dust of compulsories settled, who stood where in a competition where misread rules, shaky landings, and perfectly coiffed hair all played a role?
Step inside the 1952 Olympic women’s gymnastics arena and discover what happened on Tuesday, July 22, during the women’s compulsories.
At the 1952 Helsinki Olympics, the Soviet team made a commanding debut, taking gold in the team competition with relatively little controversy—aside from a few objections from the Swiss and Germans about potential overscoring. But beyond the medal ceremonies and national pride, the scoring told a more complex story.
Melchior Waldvogel undertook the painstaking task of reviewing more than 10,000 individual scores to assess the fairness of the judging. Though he flagged instances of judging bias, the team and individual all-around results held up to scrutiny because numerous scores determined the results, rendering “small” judging mistakes less impactful. But those “small” judging mistakes could have a large impact on the individual apparatus results, raising the question: Was it still appropriate to award individual medals for each apparatus? (Reminder: Apparatus finals did not exist at the time.)
Here’s what Waldvogel wrote for the German Olympic Committee’s report.
MELCHIOR WALDVOGEL-ZUERICH
THE SCORING AT THE 1952 OLYMPIC TOURNAMENT
Rarely has a team ranking of major international gymnastics competitions remained less controversial than that of the 1952 Olympic Games. The team victory of the Russians was generally recognized, although, for German and Switzerland, it was felt to be a few points too high. The Finns confirmed Switzerland’s second place, while the Germans approved of the better overall performance of the Finns.
However, since the scoring was repeatedly the subject of fierce criticism – especially from the participants themselves – we reviewed the entire scoring material made available by the technical director of the International Gymnastics Federation, i.e. over 10,000 individual scores, and checked it with regard to the accusations made. Although individual judges cannot be spared the accusation of partiality, it must be noted, in general, that never before has such a large-scale international competition been judged so well and responsibly, and in many cases even exemplarily.
The scoring of the compulsory exercises of all 8 gymnasts
Parallel Bars
| Mironov (URS) | Poljšak (YUG) | Fedra (AUT) | Walter (SUI) | |
| URS | 73.90 | 72.80 | 73.20 | 73.80 |
| SUI | 74.70 | 76.50 | 76.50 | 76.40 |
| FIN | 73.20 | 74.80 | 73.80 | 73.70 |
| GER | 75.20 | 76.10 | 76.20 | 75.20 |
An exemplary scoring! Mironov/Russia, Fedra/Austria and Bach/Switzerland score almost equally. Remarkably, the same distance between Germany and Russia in the case of the Russian Mironov (1.30) and the Swiss Bach (1.40), the Yugoslav Poljšak falls slightly out of line with its distance (3.30) to the detriment of the Russians.
Pommel Horse
| Eichinger (GER) | Thommes (LUX) | Ježek (TCH) | Sárkány (HUN) | |
| URS | 71.10 | 70.30 | 72.20 | 72.30 |
| SUI | 74.80 | 74.40 | 75.20 | 74.80 |
| FIN | 73.20 | 72.10 | 72.10 | 71.70 |
| GER | 75.10 | 74.40 | 75.00 | 74.60 |
All scores for the individual countries were almost identical among all judges. In a comparison between Germany and Russia, the German Eichinger arrived at a difference of 4.00 points for Germany, Ježek of Czechoslovakia at 2.80, and Sárkány of Hungary at 2.30. The low scoring of the Russians can be explained by Leonkin’s failure (4.0, 3.50, 4.0, 3.50).
Floor Exercise
| Bitsch (FRA) | Rethi (ROU) | Rasmussen (DEN) | Matthews (GBR) | |
| URS | 70.10 | 73.10 | 71.80 | 72.30 |
| SUI | 68.80 | 67.40 | 68.00 | 67.50 |
| FIN | 69.40 | 69.00 | 70.60 | 70.50 |
| GER | 68.10 | 68.10 | 68.00 | 68.90 |
High Bar
| Bolt (GBR) | Gulack (USA) | Bertram (GER) | Teräsvirta (FIN) | |
| URS | 74.60 | 74.80 | 74.40 | 74.90 |
| SUI | 76.30 | 76.00 | 75.20 | 75.00 |
| FIN | 76.70 | 76.70 | 75.40 | 76.80 |
| GER | 74.70 | 72.20! | 75.50 | 74.20 |
While the scores for floor exercise are again almost balanced, the American Gulack stands out in high bar scoring for Germany, giving significantly lower scores than the other judges. All other scores are again balanced.
Rings
| Hänggi (SUI) | Stenman (SWE) | Rost (POL) | Lucchetti (ITA) | |
| URS | 74.70 | 76.30 | 77.60 | 75.20 |
| SUI | 75.50 | 72.70 | 72.10 | 71.30 |
| FIN | 72.30 | 73.50 | 71.50 | 71.70 |
| GER | 72.90 | 73.30 | 72.10 | 72.50 |
Vault
| Krathy (AUT) | Palolampi (FIN) | Dimitriev (URS) | Šuligoj (YUG) | |
| URS | 72.90 | 72.90 | 75.10 | 73.40 |
| SUI | 75.10 | 74.80 | 74.00 | 74.90 |
| FIN | 73.30 | 73.60 | 72.20 | 70.80 |
| GER | 74.40 | 74.20 | 72.50 | 72.60 |
Hänggi-Switzerland rates his team higher than the Russians on the rings (+0.80), while the Pole Rost rates the Russian team higher by 4.50 (!).
When it comes to vaulting, the larger difference between Germany and Russia is noticeable for the Russian Dimitriev (+2.60 for Russia), while the scores of the Yugoslavs (+1.20 for Russia), the Austrians (+ 1.50 for Germany) and the Finns (+ 1.30 for Germany) make us think. Dimitriev alone also scores Russia higher than Switzerland (+1.10 for Russia) while the three other judges (+2.30, +1.90, +1.50) rate the Swiss higher.
The overall picture of the compulsory score is uniform and pleasing. Of course, the aforementioned differences did not have such a strong effect on the actual score, since, on the one hand, the corner scores (highest and lowest judges’ scores for each gymnast) were dropped, and, on the other hand, only 5 out of the 8 gymnasts for the team event counted
The scores for optionals
Parallel Bars
| Fedra (AUT) | Dudek (TCH) | Kirbicki (POL) | Wagner (SUI) | Max. Differences | |
| URS | 77.90 | 78.20! | 78.10! | 77.60 | 0.60 |
| SUI | 76.40 | 75.20! | 74.20! | 77.00 | 2.80! |
| Wagner (SUI) | André (FRA) | ||||
| FIN | 73.60 | 73.00 | 73.20 | 73.70 | 0.70 |
| GER | 75.60 | 74.20 | 75.00 | 74.40 | 1.20 |
[Reminder: The judges rotated to prevent fatigue, so the judging panel also changed.]
This is where the observation made by many international experts of the undervaluation of Switzerland vis-à-vis Russia is likely to find confirmation. While all four judges are almost equal in the scores for Finland and Germany (with a slight advantage for the Germans), in Russia/Switzerland, the Austrian Fedra awards +1.50 for Russia, the Swiss Wagner +0.60 for Russia (humanly one of the greatest judging performances of the entire tournament!), while Czechoslovakia’s Dudek gave +3.00 and Poland’s Kirbicki even +3.90 for Russia!
Pommel Horse
| Dmitriev (URS) | Eichinger (GER) | Nevjar (NOR) | Diem (AUT) | Max. Differences | |
| URS | 74.80 | 74.30 | 73.80 | 72.80 | 2.00 |
| SUI | 72.10 | 70.10 | 70.90 | 73.50 | 3.40! |
| FIN | 73.50 | 73.80 | 74.20 | 72.70 | 1.50 |
| GER | 72.60 | 74.70 | 72.70 | 72.00 | 2.70! |
The optional exercises on pommel horse, which are very difficult to assess, bring small differences in scores from all points of view. Only the low scoring of the German Eichinger for Switzerland compared to Diem of Austria (difference -3.40) is striking, in contrast to his high score for Germany compared to Diem/Austria (difference +2.70).
Floor Exercise
| Serbus (TCH) | Gulack (USA) | Kerezsi (HUN) | Holm (DEN) | Max. Differences | |
| URS | 76.70 | 74.70 | 76.60 | 75.60 | 2.00 |
| SUI | 74.30 | 74.10 | 73.80 | 74.60 | 0.80 |
| Palalampi (FIN) | Kerezsi (HUN) | ||||
| FIN | 75.30 | 76.50 | 76.50 | 75.30 | 1.20 |
| GER | 63.50 | 63.80 | 63.80 | 63.10 | 0.70 |
The biggest difference is found in the evaluation of the Russian team by Serbus/Czechoslovakia and Gulack/USA (2.00 points), while all other evaluations show smaller differences. The performance of the Germans is assessed with differences of only 0.70, that of the Finns and Swiss with only 1.20.
The Hungarian Kerezsi and the American Gulack show a difference of 2.80:0.60 in their assessment of the Russians and Swiss.
High Bar
| Costigliolo (ITA) | Cumiski (USA) | Gregorka (YUG) | Teräsvirta (FIN) | Max. Differences | |
| URS | 76.20 | 74.90 | 76.20 | 75.50 | 1.30 |
| SUI | 76.00 | 75.10 | 76.30 | 74.80 | 1.50 |
| FIN | 74.40 | 75.20 | 75.70 | 75.90 | 1.50 |
| Teräsvirta (FIN) | Sárkány (HUN) | ||||
| GER | 74.00 | 74.90 | 74.10 | 73.00 | 1.90 |
Rings
| Liudskanoff (BUL) | Hänggi (SUI) | Lucchetti (ITA) | Bitsch (FRA) | Max. Differences | |
| URS | 78.80 | 77.30 | 78.60 | 78.00 | 1.50 |
| SUI | 75.30 | 76.20 | 76.00 | 76.10 | 0.90 |
| FIN | 75.30 | 74.70 | 75.90 | 75.60 | 1.20 |
| Lörinczi* (ROU) | Lucchetti (ITA) | ||||
| GER | 75.10 | 74.90 | 75.00 | 74.70 | 0.40 |
[*Sormczi is the name listed in the German book. However, Lörinczi is listed as the Romanian judge in the Men’s Technical Committee minutes and in the Official Report for the Games.]
Vault
| Kujundžić (YUG) | Thommes (LUX) | Ibrahim (EGY) | Stenman (SWE) | Max. Differences | |
| URS | 75.70 | 76.40 | 75.70 | 75.70 | 0.70 |
| Stenman (SWE) | Matthews (GBR) | ||||
| SUI | 74.40 | 74.60 | 72.70 | 74.10 | 1.90 |
| FIN | 73.60 | 73.90 | 73.00 | 73.60 | 0.90 |
| Matthews (GBR) | Stenman (SWE) | ||||
| GER | 65.10 | 66.00 | 65.90 | 65.70 | 0.90 |
In light of this example from Stalder/Schwarzmann/Günthard, however, the question arises as to whether medals should continue to be awarded to individual gymnasts for individual apparatus. The performance density at the top is becoming increasingly intense, and the decision-making ability of the human eye increasingly questionable. The combined performances of the team competition and the individual all-around competition offer the possibility of preventing the smallest mistakes from having an impact on the overall ranking. The medals for individual gymnasts on each apparatus remain questionable. The team medal would be a “fair substitute.”
Our gymnastics friend Melchior Waldvogel certainly did not undertake this enormous statistical work for the purpose of a subsequent correction. The Olympic results in the team competition and the all-around are fair; they were surprisingly consistent and well judged. This favorable assessment cannot be invalidated by a few exceptions. This inspires confidence in the integrity of the international judges. This confidence is necessary, because only then can the unadulterated joy of measuring one’s strength against others be preserved.
[Note: If you’re a German speaker, you can find the German original at the bottom of the page.]
As for the Official Report, this is what it had to say about the judging…
The great number of competitors made the work of the judges extremely fatiguing. In the men’s optional exercises, it became advisable to appoint an extra judge, who spelled the others for intervals of rest. Even then, their working day stretched out to more than eight hours. It is a pleasure to be able to record that they remained attentive to the end.
Subsequent examination of the marks awarded by different judges reveals that in general the judges maintained a strict impartiality. In a few cases, however, opinions appear to have been consequently affected by the nationality of the team being judged. Whether this was due to partiality or to conflicting views in regard to style in gymnastics, it is hard to say and certainly not a question to be solved in this account. Obviously, each nation imparts a national tinge to its gymnastics.
A condition for constructive international competition activities is absolute neutrality on the part of judges and sympathetic understanding of the gymnastics of alien nations. In this respect the Helsinki Games augured well for the future.
The Official Report of the Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games of the XV Olympiad, Helsinki 1952
More on 1952
The German Original
MELCHIOR WALDVOGEL-ZÜRICH
DIE NOTENGBUNG IM OLYMPIATURNIER 1952
Seltener blieb ein Mannschaftsklassement bedeutender internationaler Turnwettkämpfe weniger umstritten als jenes der Olympischen Spiele 1952. Der Mannschaftssieg der Russen wurde allgemein anerkannt, wenngleich er im Ausrnaß in Deutschland und in der Schweiz als um einige Punkte zu hoch empfunden wurde. Die Finnen bestätigten den zweiten Platz der Schweiz, während die Deutschen die bessere Gesamtleistung der Finnen gut hießen.
Da jedoch immer wieder heftige Kritik – besonders auch von den Aktiven selbst – an der Notengebung laut wurde, haben wir das vom technischen Leiter des Internationalen Turnbundes zur Verfügung gestellte gesamte Notenmaterial, d. h. über zehntausend Einzelnoten, gesichtet und hinsichtlich der erhobenen Vorwürfe überprüft. Wenn auch einzelnen Kampfrichtern der Vorwurf der Parteilichkeit nicht erspart werden kann, muß allgemein festgestellt werden; daß noch niemals bei einem so umfangreichen internationalen Messen der Kräfte so gut und verantwortungsbewußt, vielfach sogar beispielhaft, gewertet wurde.
Eine vorbildliche Wertung! Mironoff/Rußland, Fedra/Österreich und Bach/Schweiz werten fast gleich. Auffallend auch der gleiche Abstand zwischen Deutschland und Rußland bei dem Russen Mironoff (1.30) und dem Schweizer Bach (1.40), Der Jugoslawe Poljsaak fällt mit seinem Abstand (3.30) zuungunsten der Russen etwas aus dem Rahmen.
Alle Wertungen der einzelnen Länder untereinander bei allen Kampfrichtern mit fast gleichen Abständen. Im Vergleich Deutschland-Rußland kommt der Deutsche Eichinger zu einer Differenz von 4.00 Punkten für Deutschland, Jezek/Tschechoslowakei zu 2.80, Sarkany-Ungarn zu 2.30. Die niedrigen Wertungen der Russen erklären sich aus dem Versagen Leonkins (4.0, 3.50, 4.0, 3.50).
Während beim Bodenturnen die Wertung wiederum fast ausgeglichen ist, fällt bei der Reckwertung für Deutschland der Amerikaner Gulack, als erheblich unter den anderen Kampfrichtern taxierend, auf. Alle anderen Wertungen wiederum ausgeglichen.
Hänggi-Schweiz bewertet seine Mannschaft an den Ringen höher als die Russen ( +0.80), während der Pole Rost die russische Mannschaft um 4.50 höher einschätzt(!).
Beim Pferdsprung fällt die größere Differenz Deutschland-Rußland bei dem Russen Dimitrijeff ( +2.60 für Rußland) auf, während die Noten des Jugoslawen ( +1.20 für Rußland), des Österreichers ( + 1.50 für Deutschland) und des Finnen ( + 1.30 für Deutschland) zu denken geben. Dimitrijeff bewertet auch allein Rußland der Schweiz gegenüber höher ( +1.10 für Rußland) während die drei anderen Kampfrichter ( +2.30, +1.90, +1.50) die Schweizer höher einschätzen.
Das Gesamtbild der Pflichtnoten ist einheitlich und erfreulich. Die oben erwähnten Unterschiede haben sich in den tatsächlichen Noten selbstverständlich nicht so stark ausgewirkt, da einmal die Ecknoten (höchste und niedrigste Wertung) in Fortfall kamen und zum anderen nur 5 von den 8 Turnern für den Mannschaftskampf zählten
Die Wertungen beim Kürturnen
Hier dürfte die von vielen internationalen Fachleuten gemachte Beobachtung der Unterbewertung der Schweiz gegenüber Rußland ihre Bestätigung finden. Während sich alle vier Kampfrichter bei den Noten für Finnland und Deutschland fast ebenbürtig sind (leichte Überlegenheit der Deutschen), werten im Verhältnis Rußland/Schweiz der Österreicher Fedra +1.50 für Rußland, der Schweizer Wagner +0.60 für Rußland (menschlich eine der großartigsten Kampfrichterleistungen des ganzen Turniers!), der Tschechoslowake Dudek aber +3.00 und der Pole Kirbicki sogar +3.90 für Rußland!
Das sehr schwer zu taxierende Pferdkürturnen bringt geringe Notenunterschiede nach allen Gesichtspunkten. Auffallend ist lediglich die niedrige Notengebung des Deutschen Eichinger für die Schweiz gegenüber Diem-Österreich (Differenz -3.40), dagegen seine hohe Wertung für Deutschland gegenüber Diem/Österreich (Differenz +2.70).
Die stärkste Differenz finden wir in der Bewertung der russischen Mannschaft bei Serbus / Tschechoslowakei und Gulack/USA (2.00 Punkte), während alle anderen Wertungen geringere Unterschiede aufweisen. Die Leistung der Deutschen wird mit Unterschieden von nur 0.70, die der Finnen und Schweizer von nur 1.20 beurteilt.
Angesichts dieses Beispieles Stalder/Schwarzmann/Günthard aber drängt sich doch die Frage auf, ob man weiterhin an den einzelnen Geräten Medaillen für Einzelturner vergeben soll. Die Leistungsdichte der Spitze wird immer stärker, die Entscheidungsfähigkeit des menschlichen Auges immer fragwürdiger. Die summierten Leistungen des Mannschaftskampfes und des Einzel-Zwölfkampfes bieten die Möglichkeit, kleinste Fehler in der Gesamtwertung nicht zur Auswirkung kommen zu lassen. Die Medaillen für Einzelturner an jedem Gerät bleiben fraglich. Die Mannschaftsmedaille wäre ein „gerechter Ersatz”.
Unser Turnfreund Melchior Waldvogel hat diese ungeheure statistische Arbeit ganz gewiß nicht zum Zwecke einer nachträglichen Korrektur unternommen. Das olympische Ergebnis im Mannschaftskampf und im Zwölfkampf ist gerecht, es wurde überraschend gleichmäßig und gut gewertet. Diese günstige Feststellung kann auch nicht durch einige Ausnahmen entkräftet werden. Das gibt Vertrauen in die Moral der internationalen Kampfrichterschaft. Dieses Vertrauen aber ist notwendig, denn nur dann bleibt die ungetrübte Freude am Messen der gegenseitigen Kräfte erhalten.
At the 1952 Olympics, the Soviet men’s gymnastics team made one thing clear: they were undoubtedly the best in the world. Previous powerhouses like the Swiss, Finns, and Germans could not keep up. Soviet athletes not only claimed multiple gold medals but also demonstrated the superiority of their rigorous training and innovative techniques. Viktor Chukarin’s comeback from a shaky compulsory routine on floor exercise to clinch the all-around title epitomized their dominance.
The Soviets’ overwhelming strength was especially visible on rings, where they set new standards of power and precision, and on pommel horse, where their skill pushed the global bar higher. Still, their triumph came with controversy as some judges were accused of favoritism, and critics from Germany and Finland questioned the scoring and individual event placements, particularly Chukarin’s gold on vault. Yet, no one could deny that the Soviet athletes performed with such mastery that they forced the world to recognize them as the new leaders in gymnastics.
Here’s more than you ever wanted to know about what happened on Monday, July 21, 1952.
The men’s artistic gymnastics competition at the 1952 Helsinki Olympics began with a record 29 nations participating. With so many competitors, organizers had to divide the compulsory rounds across two days and three groups, with the first group featuring Olympic favorites such as the Soviet Union, Switzerland, and the host nation, Finland. Excitement filled the Helsinki Exhibition Hall on Saturday morning—before the Olympics officially opened—as fans, judges, and journalists gathered to see the medal favorites. The stakes were high, the nerves palpable, and many believed the final team standings would be largely decided by day’s end.
And they weren’t wrong. From the Swiss press to German technical reports, all agreed: the compulsory routines were the decisive battleground. The Soviet gymnasts, competing for the first time in Olympic history, made an immediate impression, flexing both their power and consistency, especially on rings and pommel horse. But the Swiss weren’t going down quietly, turning in spectacular parallel bars routines that reminded everyone why they were world champions. What unfolded wasn’t just a competition; it was a clash of styles playing out on gymnastics’ grandest stage.
Here’s more than you ever wanted to know about the men’s compulsories in Helsinki…
In 1952, the Soviet Union made its long-anticipated debut at the Olympic Games, and elite competitive gymnastics, along with the broader world of international sports, would never be the same. But how did a country so wary of Western influence, and so determined to control its global image, come to participate in what was once seen as a bourgeois spectacle?
The path to participation was anything but straightforward. It involved high-level political debates, intense internal pressure to guarantee victory, and even intelligence gathering to assess the strength of foreign competitors. Thanks to the work of historian Jenifer Parks, we now have a clearer picture of the motives, hesitations, and strategies behind this monumental shift. Here’s a very brief overview of what happened.
Reminder: The Soviet Union had participated in the 1937 Workers’ Olympiad. Unfortunately, at the time of this writing, I have not been able to track down the results of the gymnastics competition in 1937.
Quick Facts:
The Soviet Union weighed participating in the 1948 Olympics but ultimately held back, wary of falling short in the medal count.
Note: Nikolai Romanov was the chairman of the USSR Committee on Physical Culture and Sport. The Politburo was the principal policymaking committee of the communist party in the Soviet Union.
Note #2: The following quotes come from Jenifer Parks’s “Verbal Gymnastics: Sports, Bureaucracy, and the Soviet Union’s Entrance into the Olympic Games, 1946-1952.”
In 1947, Nikolai Romanov, in a letter to Politburo member Andrei Zhdanov, asked permission to prepare a Soviet team for the 1948 Olympic Games, stressing the huge popularity of the Games throughout the world, the increasing number of countries joining the Olympics, and the idealized message of the Olympic Movement to justify his request. According to Romanov, Stalin believed that even the second place finish of Soviet wrestlers at the 1946 European Championships could discredit the Soviet Union and chastised Romanov for sending a team to the competition: “if you are not ready, then there’s no need to participate.” From this exchange, Romanov drew the lesson that only the guarantee of first place would induce the Soviet leadership to send athletes to compete abroad. Following Stalin’s cue, Romanov couched his request to send a team to the 1948 Olympics in terms of “total team victory.” Since Soviet athletes could reasonably hope only for second, third, or fourth place in events such as track and field, boxing, and swimming, where the United States held prominence, Romanov conceded that the Soviet Union could not surpass the United States in medals. Reporting to Zhdanov in 1947 that competing nations observed an unofficial point system based on the first six places in each event, he asserted nonetheless that by competing in every sport on the program and placing in the top six in those sports the Soviet team could secure full team victory based on the “unofficial” points system.
The IOC feared the Soviets might crash the 1952 Olympics—uninvited but impossible to ignore.
Note: Edström was the IOC president from 1946 to 1952. Brundage served as IOC president from 1952 to 1972.
Unable to reconcile the Soviet Union’s possible entrance with the Olympic amateur ideal, Brundage found refuge in the IOC’s bureaucratic process. Before the Soviet Union formed a National Olympic Committee (NOC) and petitioned the IOC for recognition in 1951, Brundage could avoid dealing with the challenge to the Olympic amateur ideal and focus instead on the more clearly defined rules of the IOC under which no country lacking a National Olympic Committee would be invited to participate in the Olympic Games. Edstrom now made several attempts to persuade Nikolai Romanov, chairman of the Soviet Sports Committee, that the Soviet Union would be allowed to participate in the Olympic Games only if it followed IOC rules and formed a National Olympic Committee. The many missives Edström sent to Romanov went unanswered, creating further anxiety for the IOC president and vice-president. Hearing nothing from their Soviet contact, Edstrom and Brundage worried that the Soviet Union might cause embarrassment to the IOC by sending a delegation to Helsinki with or without official recognition. Reminding Edstrom of the Soviet Union’s unexpected appearance at the 1946 European Track and Field Championships in Oslo, Brundage stated:
‘It would not surprise me if they tried the same stunt at Helsinki in 1952 … Not only the IOC but also our Finnish friends must be prepared for this contingency in order to avoid finding ourselves in the middle of a most embarrassing and dangerous controversy.’
Romanov’s silence, however, had more to do with indecision within the Soviet party-state bureaucracy than with a plot to enter the Olympics on their own terms.
Brundage worried that the Soviet Union would bring the IOC “nothing but trouble.”
Unlike many of his colleagues, Brundage lacked an aristocratic pedigree, having risen to a position of wealth and prominence through business. This self-made man, however, betrayed the “gentlemen’s club” mentality of the IOC when, in a circular letter to IOC members, he waxed nostalgic over the days when
‘the care exercised in the selection of the individuals who composed the IOC produced members who, no matter where they came from or what their language, were of the same general type and they were soon welded into what has so often been called the “Olympic Family.’”
In Brundage’s view, the Soviets, “not understanding fair play, good sportsmanship and amateurism,” were obviously not of “the same general type” as the current IOC members and would “bring with them nothing but trouble.”
Privately, Soviet officials were sweating. Could they actually beat the West in medals? Just to be safe, they did their homework—on everyone else’s athletes.
Despite the election of Andrianov to the IOC and the recognition of the Soviet NOC, the Soviet leadership continued to withhold permission for a team to be sent to the Games: invitations to compete in both the winter Games in Oslo and the Helsinki Summer Games remained unanswered. As budget constraints and continued avoidance of foreign sporting contacts further jeopardized the Olympic project, Romanov relied heavily on Andrianov and other leaders within the Sports Committee to maintain control over Olympic training measures. In June 1951, the official invitation to participate in the 1952 winter Games set off a flurry of in-house memos and reports deliberating on the Soviet athletes’ chances of success. With the decision to compete in either the winter or summer Games still up in the air, Andrianov called on various departments in the sports apparatus to compare their athletes’ achievements to those of foreign athletes to assess the state of Olympic training. Setting November 1, 1951, as the deadline, Andrianov hoped to gather all necessary information so that a decision could be reached regarding Olympic participation.
[…]
Romanov and the sports administrators now had to guarantee a full team victory under continued restrictions on international competition, and Soviet sports leaders struggled with the question of international experience almost to the eve of the Soviet Olympic debut. On April 30, 1952, less than two months before the opening of the Games in Helsinki, Romanov wrote to Malenkov requesting that the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) provide information to the Sport Committee about the Olympic training of foreign athletes, specifically those from the USA, England, Switzerland, and France. This request strongly suggests that the dearth of foreign sporting contacts continued in the months leading up to the Helsinki Olympics, forcing Romanov to obtain through the MVD what his committee had been unable to get through international competition and trainer exchanges. Working under political and ideological constraints, trainers and bureaucrats maintained their call for more international meets, tried to find out as much as possible about foreign sporting activities, and did everything they could to prepare their athletes.
Officially, the U.S. topped the medal tally in 1952. Unofficially? The Soviets had a different version of events.
The reason for this becomes clear as one looks at discrepancies in the unofficial point totals of the United States and the Soviet Union. At the end of the Olympic Games in Helsinki, Pravda (Truth), the official newspaper of the Communist Party, proclaimed victory without reference to point totals, reporting simply that the “athletes of the Soviet Union took first place.” On the same day, the New York Times claimed a win for the USA based on a score of 614 to 553 ½. Upon his return to Soviet Union, Romanov told the members of the Politburo that while the United States had won more medals in the Games, the Soviet Union tied with the USA in terms of points, with 494. This revised total appeared in the New York Times on August 7. Part of the disparity comes from the use of two different point systems. Romanov calculated his results assigning seven points for first place, five for second, four for third, etc., but the United States’ system gave ten points for first place. Hours after Romanov’s appearance before the Politburo, Malenkov called to confirm the totals. Malenkov put to rest any fears Romanov might have had over his fate by telling him to “Relax. Go home. Rest.” After the Games, criticism for poor performance in certain events fell on athletes and trainers, rather than on Romanov and the Sports Committee. Satisfied with the assurance that the United States had not won outright, the Politburo declared its first Olympic Games an adequate success, and Romanov’s point tally became the official word for the next fifty years. In October 2002, however, Aksel’ Vartanian recalculated the points and found that even by Romanov’s point system, the United States came out on top with a score of 495 to 487. The fact that his point totals remained unchallenged for fifty years indicates the security of Romanov’s position and the influence he enjoyed in the Politburo.
More on 1952
In 1948, Marie Provazníková—then president of the Women’s Technical Committee (WTC)—defected to the United States after the London Olympics, marking the beginning of a turbulent period for the committee. The 1952 report from the WTC President reflects many of the changes that followed.
Yet despite the leadership instability, participation in women’s gymnastics grew significantly between 1948 and 1952. The committee saw it as their responsibility to ensure that this growth served the “health, joie de vivre, and general well-being” of “lady gymnasts.” (Which, to modern readers, probably makes us roll our eyes a bit.)
Enjoy this translation of Liisa Orko’s 1952 report.
Old FIG minutes offer a fascinating glimpse into the history of gymnastics. Imagine this: just days before the start of the Olympic Games, the Women’s Technical Committee discovered that several countries had been practicing a section of the compulsory bars routine incorrectly. What would you have done?
Back in 1928, when women first competed in Olympic gymnastics, only two of the judges were women—the rest were men. Should male judges be permitted again?
And what about scoring routines to the hundredth of a point (e.g., 8.95) rather than using only tenths (8.90)? Should that be allowed?
Read on for a translated excerpt from the 1952 minutes to find out. Special thanks to Hardy Fink for providing the original French text.
How many hours should a judge work every day? In 1952, the Men’s Technical Committee thought that 8 hours should be the maximum. (Judges, how many hours do you work daily at competitions?)
Here’s a translation of the 1952 report by Ernest Maurer, President of the Men’s Technical Committee. You can read the full minutes for the Men’s Technical Committee meetings here.
Why should you care about the minutes from a Men’s Technical Committee meeting in 1952? It was so long ago. What could they possibly reveal about gymnastics today?
Plenty.
Take vault, for example. The 1952 minutes clarified what counted as a scoreable attempt and what we now refer to as an “empty run.” Back then, gymnasts were allowed two attempts for both their compulsory and optional vaults (“Au cheval-sautoir, tant imposé qu’à volonté, chaque gymnaste a droit à deux exécutions; la meilleure exécution est valable.”). But the committee had to clarify what “two executions” meant. As you’ll see in the minutes belows, they determined that, if a gymnast didn’t touch the springboard or the horse during an attempt, they would be permitted a third attempt. This should sound familiar, given that today’s gymnasts are permitted one empty run at FIG events. (But they now incur a 1.0 deduction for an empty run.)
Then there’s the matter of participation. So many teams showed up to the 1952 Helsinki Olympics that, at the last minute, the organizers had to add an extra day of compulsories, which was held on the morning of the opening ceremonies. This sparked a conversation about quantity versus quality: Should more gymnasts compete, or solely the best of the best? It’s a debate that persists to this day at the World Championships, with passionate arguments on both sides.
With no further ado, here’s a translation of the 1952 minutes. Thanks to Hardy Fink for supplying the original French text.
